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Michael Hudson's blog

Wall Street’s Capital Gain Plan

Mon, 03/12/2012 - 8:29am
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Transcript

PAUL JAY, SENIOR EDITOR, TRNN: Welcome to The Real News Network. I’m Paul Jay in Washington. Concentration of ownership leads to concentration of political power. It’s rather obvious. It’s practically a truism. But it’s not something you will hear said very often on mainstream media. But it certainly goes to the core of what’s happening in Europe, Greece, and in United States and Canada and many—most other countries, if not all. Now joining us to talk about the relationship of banks, big banks, financial power, and public policy is Michael Hudson. Michael was a former Wall Street financial analyst. He’s now a distinguished research professor of economics at the University of Missouri–Kansas City. And you can find his work at Michael-Hudson.com. Thanks for joining us, Michael.

MICHAEL HUDSON, RESEARCH PROF., UMKC: Thank you very much, Paul.

JAY: You’ve written that, you know, all economies are planned to some extent; this idea that there’s simply a free market without government planning is not very realistic. And [incompr.] you’ve raised the question: but who does the planning, and for whom? Talk about that.

HUDSON: Well, in the past, ever since the Neolithic agriculture, wherever you have a division of labor and a time gap between production and a final payment, planting and harvesting, you need forward planning. The whole idea from the 18th and 19th and early 20th century is that the governments would make a forward plan. The French called this planification, or indicative planning. But if the governments don’t plan to make subsidies and tariffs and taxes, then if you dismantle government planning, then by default all of the planning passes into the hands of bankers. And the bankers end up allocating the nation’s resources, because it’s the bankers who give the credit. And instead of the government deciding how to steer the economy forward—by subsidizing education, by building private infrastructure—all of a sudden the infrastructure and the division of labor and the resources are passed on to the banks, and the banks are going to decide, okay, sell all the public domain, sell the roads and the railway systems and the power systems, and we will decide who gets the credit, and we’ll do the planning. Well, the problem is is the financial timeframe is very short-term. It’s hit and run. They’re into making a bundle as quick as they can on one project and then go on to the next project. And they leave an economy loaded down with debt, which is what you have from the corporate takeover movement, from the hedge funds, from the leveraged buyouts. The financial plan is to take all of the revenue of a corporation, and see how much revenue can be pledged to pay debt service, and we’re going to find a buyer who’s going to buy this company and pledge all the cash flow to us [incompr.] the company. Well, this doesn’t leave any money over, left for tangible capital investment in new plant and equipment. Just like in a building—if Donald Trump or a real estate investor is buying a property, the basic motto of a real estate investor is rent is for paying interest. A investor will calculate how much rent is there, and they’ll bid for a big office building. The winner is the person who pledges the whole of the rental cash flow to the bank for interest. And they do this because they’re not after the rent; they’re after the capital gain as banks keep lending more and more money for the process to increase the whole price. And what you have is asset price inflation. Well, what’s so unique about this is in Europe you have this whole implanted memory of the German hyperinflation in the 1920s, that the Germans and the Europeans say, well, wait a minute, we can’t have a central bank lending to governments, because that’s inflationary or is—. In fact, we’ve just seeing this huge inflation by the commercial banking system in the United States, England, and Europe. But what they have inflated isn’t commodity prices or wages or consumer prices; they’ve inflated housing prices, stock prices, bond prices, the price of buying a retirement income. And so the commercial banks tend to inflate the prices of assets. And what that has done is increase the value of wealth and real estate and corporate ownership in finance relative to labor. So there’s been an enormous concentration of wealth in the United States and polarization since interest rates began to come down in 1980, from 20 percent then to about 1 percent now. So the financial plan is basically an asset grab. They want to load the whole economy down with debt. A consumer will come in and say, I’d like to take out a loan. They’ll say, how much do you earn? Everything over subsistence they’ll want as a loan. When I was at Chase Manhattan, for instance—and I joined in 1994. And—1964, I’m sorry. My first job was to analyze Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and my job was to see how much of a surplus in foreign exchange can these countries generate by exporting, by selling off their property. And once we have the surplus, if that’s capitalized all into debt service, how much can they afford to borrow from us in order—so that we can get paid their entire surplus for making loans for them? And then, what’s the portion of Chase’s loans to other New York banks and other American banks? And so we’ll all have the whole economic surpluses of entire countries being paid to the banks. Well, once the surplus is paid to the banks, there’s nothing over for rising living standards, there is nothing over for new capital investment, there is nothing over for long-term research and development. When you have Henry Kravis or the other takeover artists take over a company, the first thing they do is cut back long-term projects—they cut back research and development, they slash projects that have a long maturation period—and take it out.

JAY: Right. Michael, you know, if you look at the sort of graph of the strength of the financial sector or size of the financial sector in relationship to the GDP, it gets very, very high around 1931-1932, it sort of starts to go down, then it really dips in World War II. After World War II it’s like a steady climb. But it seems like in terms of planning, in government planning, that pre, you could say, 1980, ’70s, you had a little more mix that—you had government planning always, you could say, in the final analysis, in the interest of the elites and various—but more various sectors of the economy than just so much the financial sector. We’re now—it seems like by far the weight of public policy is on the side or being directed by the finance sector. If you agree with that as an idea, why?

HUDSON: Even in the—let’s take the case of the industrial corporations. Prior to 1980—well, in the 1930s, most industrial corporations, if you look at who is a CEO, they were lawyers, because the lawyers had to deal with debt and insolvency. During World War II they tended to be military people, generals. They also were industrial technologists, they were inventors, they were people who came from the production end. Then from about the 1960s and ’70s you had salesmen become the CEOs. They were people who focused on marketing [inaud.], because that was how the industrial [inaud.] to production. But since 1980 you had a change. The business school focus was shifted. And Robert Locke recently wrote a book on business school education pointing out that the whole focus of business school education now was to have industrial companies run by financial managers—not salesmen, not production end, not lawyers, but financial managers. And so you have a system where not only are the banks allocating credit in the economy, but it’s the corporate sector itself, the industrial sector, is treating companies, industrial companies, as if the purpose was to squeeze out a financial surplus to pay bondholders and stockholders. And, of course, you also have the phenomenon since 1980 that you really didn’t have before of stock options. If you pay the managers in stock options, the whole objective of running a company is to increase the value of the rewards that the managers get by exercising the stock options.

JAY: Now—but is the strength of the financial sector in the fact—as you’re describing, in terms of corporate leadership, so much is about finance. Is the underlying issue there is that there’s more money to be made through finance and speculation and such, and less through, you know, what was considered more normal productive activity?

HUDSON: It’s certainly easier money. It’s easier to—. If you’re a corporation and you have, say, $1 million cash flow and you have a choice—am I going to invest this in trying to develop a new product that’s very risky and don’t know how to market it, or am I going to use it to buy my own stock?—if they—you just use this money on a stock buyback to buy their stock, they’re going to raise the price of the stock. This increases the value of the stock option that the managers give themselves. And all of a sudden they make money that way. They don’t have to worry about developing a new product, of getting approval, of finding markets for it, of advertising.

JAY: So whether it’s financial speculation or these kinds of stock buybacks, parasitical activity winds up being more profitable than productive activity.

HUDSON: It’s quicker and it’s easier to make a Ponzi scheme than to create an actual industrial advance. That’s why all the financial managers would love to do what Bernie Madoff did and do a Ponzi scheme, because it’s really easier to do that than to actually make money by being productive.

JAY: Alright. Thanks for joining us, Michael.

HUDSON: Thank you very much.

The Economy Doesn’t Need to Suffer Neoliberal Austerity

Tue, 03/06/2012 - 1:00pm
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I have just returned from Rimini, Italy, where I experienced one of the most amazing spectacles of my academic life. Four of us associated with the University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) were invited to lecture for three days on Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and explain why Europe is in such monetary trouble today – and to show that there is an alternative, that the enforced austerity for the 99% and vast wealth grab by the 1% is not a force of nature.

Stephanie Kelton (incoming UMKC Economics Dept. chair and editor of its economic blog, New Economic Perspectives), criminologist and law professor Bill Black, investment banker Marshall Auerback and me (along with a French economist, Alain Parquez) stepped into the basketball auditorium on Friday night. We walked down, and down, and further down the central aisle, past a packed audience reported as over 2,100. It was like entering the Oscars as People called out our first names. Some told us they had read all of our economics blogs. Stephanie joked that now she understood how the Beatles felt. There was prolonged applause – all for an intellectual rather than a physical sporting event.

With one difference, of course: Our adversaries were not there. There was much press, but the prevailing Euro-technocrats (the bank lobbyists who determine European economic policy) hoped that the less discussion of possible alternatives to austerity, the easier it would be to force their brutal financial grab through.

All the audience members had contributed to raise the funds to fly us over from the United States (and from France for Alain), and treat us to Federico Fellini’s Grand Hotel on the Rimini beach. The conference was organized by reporter Paolo Barnard, who had studied MMT with Randall Wray and realized that there was plenty of demand in Italian mass culture for a discussion of what actually was determining the living conditions of Europe. His aim was to show that the emerging financial elite hopes to use this crisis as their opportunity to carve out personal fiefdoms by privatizing the public domain of the governments they have seduced, bribed or coerced into unnecessary debt. Instead of using a central bank to finance their deficits, governments are told to dump these assets under distress conditions at fire sale prices. So governments end up beholden to bondholders and Eurocrats drawn from neoliberal ranks.

Paolo and his enormous support staff of translators and interns provided us an opportunity to give an approach to monetary and tax theory and policy that until recently was almost unheard of in the United States. Just one week earlier the Washington Post published a review of MMT, followed by a long discussion in the Financial Times. But the theory remains grounded primarily at the UMKC’s economics department and the Levy Institute at Bard College, with which most of us are associated.

The basic thrust of our argument is that just as commercial banks now create credit electronically on their computer keyboards (creating a bank account credit for borrowers in exchange for their signing an IOU at interest), so governments can create their own money. They can reclaim this proper function without incurring needless interest-bearing debt to private bondholders or from banks that create credit by electronic fiat. Government computer keyboards can provide nearly free credit creation to finance spending.

Once the money is created by government, the crucial difference is that governments spend it (at least in principle) to promote long-term growth and employment, invest in public infrastructure, research and development, provide health care and other basic economic functions. Banks have a more short-term time frame and narrowly self-interested motivation. Some 80% of their loans are mortgages against real estate. Banks lend against collateral in place, and the economy’s largest assets are land and buildings. Although banks loans also are used to finance leveraged buyouts and corporate takeovers, most new fixed capital investment by corporations is financed out of retained earnings, not bank credit.

And contrary to popular belief, the stock market has ceased to be a source of such financing. Textbook diagrams still depict it as raising money for new capital investment. Unfortunately, it has been turned into a vehicle to buy out companies on credit (e.g., with high interest junk bonds), replacing equity with debt (“taking a company private” from its stockholders). Inasmuch as interest payments are tax-deductible – on the pretense that they are a necessary cost of doing business – corporate income-tax payments are lowered. And what the tax collector relinquishes is available to be paid out to the bankers and bondholders who get rich by loading the economy down with debt.

The upshot is that the flow of corporate earnings is not used for productive investment, but is diverted to the financial sector – not only to pay interest and penalties to banks, but for stock buybacks intended to support stock prices and hence the value of stock options that managers of today’s financialized companies give themselves.

Welcome to the post-industrial economy, financial style. Industrial capitalism has passed through a series of stages of finance capitalism, from Pension-Fund capitalism via Globalized Dollarization and the Bubble Economy to the Negative Equity stage, foreclosure time, debt deflation, and austerity – and now what looks like debt peonage in Europe, above all for the PIIGS: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. (The Baltic countries of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania have been plunged so deeply into debt that their populations are emigrating to find work and flee debt-burdened real estate. The same has plagued Iceland since its bank rip-offs collapsed in 2008.)

Why aren’t economists describing these phenomena? The answer is a combination of political ideology and analytic blinders. As soon as the Rimini conference ended on Sunday evening, for instance, Paul Krugman’s Monday, February 27 New York Times column, “What Ails Europe?” blamed the euro’s problems simply on the inability of countries to devalue their currencies. He rightly criticized the Republican Party line that blames social welfare spending for the Eurozone’s problems, and also criticized putting the blame on budget deficits.

But he left out of account the straitjacket of the European Central Bank (ECB) inability to monetize the deficits by issuing currency or more typically, simply writing checks on the central bank’s own account. This prohibition is a result of the junk economic theology written into the EU constitution. Krugman’s rejection of MMT leads him to ignore this option:

“If the peripheral nations still had their own currencies, they could and would use devaluation to quickly restore competitiveness. But they don’t, which means that they are in for a long period of mass unemployment and slow, grinding deflation. Their debt crises are mainly a byproduct of this sad prospect, because depressed economies lead to budget deficits and deflation magnifies the burden of debt.”

There are two problems with this neoclassical trade analysis. First, currency depreciation lowers the price of labor, while raising the price of imports. The burden of debts denominated in foreign currencies increases in keeping with the devaluation. This creates problems unless governments pass a law re-denominating all debts in their own domestic currency. This will satisfy the Prime Directive of international financing: always denominate debts in your own currency, as the United States does.

Fortunately, sovereign nations can do this ex post facto. In 1933, for instance, Franklin Roosevelt nullified the Gold Clause in U.S. loan contracts, enabling banks and other creditors to be paid in the equivalent gold value. But any sovereign government can rule how debts are to be paid (or not paid, for that matter). In his usual neoclassical fashion, Mr. Krugman ignores this debt issue:

“The afflicted nations [the PIIGs], in particular, have nothing but bad choices: either they suffer the pains of deflation or they take the drastic step of leaving the euro, which won’t be politically feasible until or unless all else fails (a point Greece seems to be approaching). Germany could help by reversing its own austerity policies and accepting higher inflation, but it won’t.”

So the existing system could work, he contends, if only Germany would inflate its economy and more German tourists spend more in Greece – assuming that the Greek government would tax enough of this spending to balance its budget. If Germany does not bail out the failed and dysfunctional economic structure, Greece will have to withdraw – but devaluation will restore equilibrium.

This is typical neoclassical over-simplification. Leaving the euro is not sufficient to avert austerity, foreclosure and debt deflation if Greece and other countries that withdraw retain the neoliberal anti-government, post-industrial policy that plagues the Eurozone. If the post-euro economy has a central bank that still refuses to finance public budget deficits, forcing the government to borrow from commercial banks and bondholders. What if the government still believes that it should balance the budget rather than provide the economy with spending power to increase its growth? In this case the post-euro government will tie itself in the same policy straitjacket that the Eurozone now imposes.

Suppose further that the Greek government slashes public welfare spending, and bails out banks for their losses, or takes losing bank gambles onto the public balance sheet, as Ireland has done. For that matter, what if the governments do what the neoliberal Obama Administration in the United States has done, and refrain from writing down real estate mortgages and other debts to the debtors’ ability to pay, as Iceland and Latvia have failed to do? The result will be debt deflation, forfeiture of property, rising unemployment – and a rising tide of emigration as the domestic economy and employment opportunities shrink. The budget deficit and balance-of-payments deficit both will worsen, not improve.

Mr. Krugman’s second error of omission is his assumption that government budgets need to be balanced. He misses the MMT point that governments can finance deficits rather than relying on bondholders. The monetary effect is identical: credit-financed spending. The difference – and it is essential – is that the government is not constrained by having to tax the economy to finance its operations, and it does not go further in debt to banks and bondholders. But despite his counter-cyclical Keynesianism, Mr. Krugman shares in principle the neoliberal mythology that demonizes the public option for credit creation, while approving private sector debt financing (even in foreign currencies!). The upshot is to make economies behave as if they still were on the gold standard, needing to borrow savings (in “hard” assets), when in fact the banks have simply sold the illusion that their electronic balance-sheet entries are “as good as gold.” That world ended in 1971 when the United States went off gold. Since then, all currencies are state currencies – often backed by U.S. Treasury IOUs rather than their own money, to be sure.

So what then is the key? It is to have a central bank that does what central banks were founded to do: monetize government budget deficits so as to spend money into the economy, in a way best intended to promote economic growth and full employment.

This is the MMT message that the five of us were invited to explain to the audience in Rimini. Some attendees came up and explained that they had come all the way from Spain, others from France and cities across Italy. And although we gave many press, radio and TV interviews, we were told that the major media were directed to ignore us as not politically correct.

Such is the censorial spirit of neoliberal monetary austerity. Its motto is TINA: There Is No Alternative, and it wants to keep matters this way. As long as it can suppress discussion of how many better alternatives there are, the hope is that the public will remain quiescent as their living standards shrink and wealth is sucked up to the top of the economic pyramid to the 1%.

The audience was vocally against remaining in the eurozone – to the extent that continued adherence to it meant submission to neoliberal pro-financial policies. (The proceedings were videotaped and will be transcribed and placed on the web. Pacifica KPFA broadcaster Bonnie Faulkner attended and is compiling a series of programs and will re-interview the speakers for her “Guns and Butter” program.) They had no naivety that withdrawal by itself would cure the problems that they originally hoped EU membership would solve: Italian political corruption, tax evasion by the rich, insider dealings, and most of all, the power of banks to siphon off the surplus and control the government, the mass media and even the universities in an attempt to brainwash the population to believe that financial control of resource allocation, tax policy and wealth distribution was all for the best to make the economy more efficient.

The audience requested above all more monetary and fiscal theory from Stephanie Kelton, who gave the clearest lecture on economics I have ever heard – a Euclidean presentation of MMT logic. For a visual of the magnitude see here.

The size of the audience filling the sports stadium to hear our economic explanation of how a real central bank should operate to avoid austerity and promote rather than discourage employment showed that the government’s attempt to brainwash the population was not working. The attempt to force TINA logic on the population is not working any better than it did in Harvard’s Economics 101 class, from which students recently walked out in protest against the unrealistic parallel universe thinking. Its appeal is mainly to intelligent but ungrounded individuals (not yet post-autistic). They are selected as useful idiots and trained to draw pictures of the economy that exclude analysis of the debt overhead, rentier free lunches and financial parasitism. One needs to be very clever, after all, to imagine a system that “saves the appearances” of an unrealistic Ptolemaic system.

There is a growing sense that Western civilization itself is at a critical juncture. It must choose between needless austerity and progress – but progress is blocked by the reluctance to write down the debt overhead. So as Prof. Kelton noted, economies face two different types of growth policy. Neoliberal policy promises to help the body politick grow by draining the blood from the body, ostensibly to help it grow more healthily and restore its balance (with power to the wealthy 1%). The MMT policy is feed the body to help it grow healthy. This requires liberating the brain – the government and policy makers that implement an economic philosophy – from the financial sector’s control.

Updates and video here

Banking Wasn’t Meant to Be Like This

Tue, 02/07/2012 - 10:18am
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The inherently symbiotic relationship between banks and governments recently has been reversed. In medieval times, wealthy bankers lent to kings and princes as their major customers. But now it is the banks that are needy, relying on governments for funding – capped by the post-2008 bailouts to save them from going bankrupt from their bad private-sector loans and gambles.

Yet the banks now browbeat governments – not by having ready cash but by threatening to go bust and drag the economy down with them if they are not given control of public tax policy, spending and planning. The process has gone furthest in the United States. Joseph Stiglitz characterizes the Obama administration’s vast transfer of money and pubic debt to the banks as a “privatizing of gains and the socializing of losses. It is a ‘partnership’ in which one partner robs the other.”1 Prof. Bill Black describes banks as becoming criminogenic and innovating “control fraud.”2 High finance has corrupted regulatory agencies, falsified account-keeping by “mark to model” trickery, and financed the campaigns of its supporters to disable public oversight. The effect is to leave banks in control of how the economy’s allocates its credit and resources.

If there is any silver lining to today’s debt crisis, it is that the present situation and trends cannot continue. So this is not only an opportunity to restructure banking; we have little choice. The urgent issue is who will control the economy: governments, or the financial sector and monopolies with which it has made an alliance.

Fortunately, it is not necessary to re-invent the wheel. Already a century ago the outlines of a productive industrial banking system were well understood. But recent bank lobbying has been remarkably successful in distracting attention away from classical analyses of how to shape the financial and tax system to best promote economic growth – by public checks on bank privileges.

How banks broke the social compact, promoting their own special interests

People used to know what banks did. Bankers took deposits and lent them out, paying short-term depositors less than they charged for risky or less liquid loans. The risk was borne by bankers, not depositors or the government. But today, bank loans are made increasingly to speculators in recklessly large amounts for quick in-and-out trading. Financial crashes have become deeper and affect a wider swath of the population as debt pyramiding has soared and credit quality plunged into the toxic category of “liars’ loans.”

The first step toward today’s mutual interdependence between high finance and government was for central banks to act as lenders of last resort to mitigate the liquidity crises that periodically resulted from the banks’ privilege of credit creation. In due course governments also provided public deposit insurance, recognizing the need to mobilize and recycle savings into capital investment as the Industrial Revolution gained momentum. In exchange for this support, they regulated banks as public utilities.

Over time, banks have sought to disable this regulatory oversight, even to the point of decriminalizing fraud. Sponsoring an ideological attack on government, they accuse public bureaucracies of “distorting” free markets (by which they mean markets free for predatory behavior). The financial sector is now making its move to concentrate planning in its own hands.

The problem is that the financial time frame is notoriously short-term and often self-destructive. And inasmuch as the banking system’s product is debt, its business plan tends to be extractive and predatory, leaving economies high-cost. This is why checks and balances are needed, along with regulatory oversight to ensure fair dealing. Dismantling public attempts to steer banking to promote economic growth (rather than merely to make bankers rich) has permitted banks to turn into something nobody anticipated. Their major customers are other financial institutions, insurance and real estate – the FIRE sector, not industrial firms. Debt leveraging by real estate and monopolies, arbitrage speculators, hedge funds and corporate raiders inflates asset prices on credit. The effect of creating “balance sheet wealth” in this way is to load down the “real” production-and-consumption economy with debt and related rentier charges, adding more to the cost of living and doing business than rising productivity reduces production costs.

Since 2008, public bailouts have taken bad loans off the banks’ balance sheet at enormous taxpayer expense – some $13 trillion in the United States, and proportionally higher in Ireland and other economies now being subjected to austerity to pay for “free market” deregulation. Bankers are holding economies hostage, threatening a monetary crash if they do not get more bailouts and nearly free central bank credit, and more mortgage and other loan guarantees for their casino-like game. The resulting “too big to fail” policy means making governments too weak to fight back.

The process that began with central bank support thus has turned into broad government guarantees against bank insolvency. The largest banks have made so many reckless loans that they have become wards of the state. Yet they have become powerful enough to capture lawmakers to act as their facilitators. The popular media and even academic economic theorists have been mobilized to pose as experts in an attempt to convince the public that financial policy is best left to technocrats – of the banks’ own choosing, as if there is no alternative policy but for governments to subsidize a financial free lunch and crown bankers as society’s rulers.

The Bubble Economy and its austerity aftermath could not have occurred without the banking sector’s success in weakening public regulation, capturing national treasuries and even disabling law enforcement. Must governments surrender to this power grab? If not, who should bear the losses run up by a financial system that has become dysfunctional? If taxpayers have to pay, their economy will become high-cost and uncompetitive – and a financial oligarchy will rule.

The present debt quandary

The endgame in times past was to write down bad debts. That meant losses for banks and investors. But today’s debt overhead is being kept in place – shifting bad loans off bank balance sheets to become public debts owed by taxpayers to save banks and their creditors from loss. Governments have given banks newly minted bonds or central bank credit in exchange for junk mortgages and bad gambles – without re-structuring the financial system to create a more stable, less debt-ridden economy. The pretense is that these bailouts will enable banks to lend enough to revive the economy by enough to pay its debts.

Seeing the handwriting on the wall, bankers are taking as much bailout money as they can get, and running, using the money to buy as much tangible property and ownership rights as they can while their lobbyists keep the public subsidy faucet running.

The pretense is that debt-strapped economies can resume business-as-usual growth by borrowing their way out of debt. But a quarter of U.S. real estate already is in negative equity – worth less than the mortgages attached to it – and the property market is still shrinking, so banks are not lending except with public Federal Housing Administration guarantees to cover whatever losses they may suffer. In any event, it already is mathematically impossible to carry today’s debt overhead without imposing austerity, debt deflation and depression.

This is not how banking was supposed to evolve. If governments are to underwrite bank loans, they may as well be doing the lending in the first place – and receiving the gains. Indeed, since 2008 the over-indebted economy’s crash led governments to become the major shareholders of the largest and most troubled banks – Citibank in the United States, Anglo-Irish Bank in Ireland, and Britain’s Royal Bank of Scotland. Yet rather than taking this opportunity to run these banks as public utilities and lower their charges for credit-card services – or most important of all, to stop their lending to speculators and gamblers – governments left these banks operating as part of the “casino capitalism” that has become their business plan.

There is no natural reason for matters to be like this. Relations between banks and government used to be the reverse. In 1307, France’s Philip IV (“The Fair”) set the tone by seizing the Knights Templars’ wealth, arresting them and putting many to death – not on financial charges, but on the accusation of devil-worshipping and satanic sexual practices. In 1344 the Peruzzi bank went broke, followed by the Bardi by making unsecured loans to Edward III of England and other monarchs who died or defaulted. Many subsequent banks had to suffer losses on loans gone bad to real estate or financial speculators.

By contrast, now the U.S., British, Irish and Latvian governments have taken bad bank loans onto their national balance sheets, imposing a heavy burden on taxpayers – while letting bankers cash out with immense wealth. These “cash for trash” swaps have turned the mortgage crisis and general debt collapse into a fiscal problem. Shifting the new public bailout debts onto the non-financial economy threaten to increase the cost of living and doing business. This is the result of the economy’s failure to distinguish productive from unproductive loans and debts. It helps explain why nations now are facing financial austerity and debt peonage instead of the leisure economy promised so eagerly by technological optimists a century ago.

So we are brought back to the question of what the proper role of banks should be. This issue was discussed exhaustively prior to World War I. It is even more urgent today.

How classical economists hoped to modernize banks as agents of industrial capitalism

Britain was the home of the Industrial Revolution, but there was little long-term lending to finance investment in factories or other means of production. British and Dutch merchant banking was to extend short-term credit on the basis of collateral such as real property or sales contracts for merchandise shipped (“receivables”). Buoyed by this trade financing, merchant bankers were successful enough to maintain long-established short-term funding practices. This meant that James Watt and other innovators were obliged to raise investment money from their families and friends rather than from banks.

It was the French and Germans who moved banking into the industrial stage to help their nations catch up. In France, the Saint-Simonians described the need to create an industrial credit system aimed at funding means of production. In effect, the Saint-Simonians proposed to restructure banks along lines akin to a mutual fund. A start was made with the Crédit Mobilier, founded by the Péreire Brothers in 1852. Their aim was to shift the banking and financial system away from debt financing at interest toward equity lending, taking returns in the form of dividends that would rise or decline in keeping with the debtor’s business fortunes. By giving businesses leeway to cut back dividends when sales and profits decline, profit-sharing agreements avoid the problem that interest must be paid willy-nilly. If an interest payment is missed, the debtor may be forced into bankruptcy and creditors can foreclose. It was to avoid this favoritism for creditors regardless of the debtor’s ability to pay that prompted Mohammed to ban interest under Islamic law.

Attracting reformers ranging from socialists to investment bankers, the Saint-Simonians won government backing for their policies under France’s Second Empire. Their approach inspired Marx as well as industrialists in Germany and protectionists in the United States and England. The common denominator of this broad spectrum was recognition that an efficient banking system was needed to finance the industry on which a strong national state and military power depended.

Germany develops an industrial banking system

It was above all in Germany that long-term financing found its expression in the Reichsbank and other large industrial banks as part of the “holy trinity” of banking, industry and government planning under Bismarck’s “state socialism.” German banks made a virtue of necessity. British banks “derived the greater part of their funds from the depositors,” and steered these savings and business deposits into mercantile trade financing. This forced domestic firms to finance most new investment out of their own earnings. By contrast, Germany’s “lack of capital … forced industry to turn to the banks for assistance,” noted the financial historian George Edwards. “A considerable proportion of the funds of the German banks came not from the deposits of customers but from the capital subscribed by the proprietors themselves.3 As a result, German banks “stressed investment operations and were formed not so much for receiving deposits and granting loans but rather for supplying the investment requirements of industry.”

When the Great War broke out in 1914, Germany’s rapid victories were widely viewed as reflecting the superior efficiency of its financial system. To some observers the war appeared as a struggle between rival forms of financial organization. At issue was not only who would rule Europe, but whether the continent would have laissez faire or a more state-socialist economy.

In 1915, shortly after fighting broke out, the Christian Socialist priest-politician Friedrich Naumann published Mitteleuropa, describing how Germany recognized more than any other nation that industrial technology needed long‑term financing and government support. His book inspired Prof. H. S. Foxwell in England to draw on his arguments in two remarkable essays published in the Economic Journal in September and December 1917: “The Nature of the Industrial Struggle,” and “The Financing of Industry and Trade.” He endorsed Naumann’s contention that “the old individualistic capitalism, of what he calls the English type, is giving way to the new, more impersonal, group form; to the disciplined scientific capitalism he claims as German.”

This was necessarily a group undertaking, with the emerging tripartite integration of industry, banking and government, with finance being “undoubtedly the main cause of the success of modern German enterprise,” Foxwell concluded (p. 514). German bank staffs included industrial experts who were forging industrial policy into a science. And in America, Thorstein Veblen’s The Engineers and the Price System (1921) voiced the new industrial philosophy calling for bankers and government planners to become engineers in shaping credit markets.

Foxwell warned that British steel, automotive, capital equipment and other heavy industry was becoming obsolete largely because its bankers failed to perceive the need to promote equity investment and extend long‑term credit. They based their loan decisions not on the new production and revenue their lending might create, but simply on what collateral they could liquidate in the event of default: inventories of unsold goods, real estate, and money due on bills for goods sold and awaiting payment from customers. And rather than investing in the shares of the companies that their loans supposedly were building up, they paid out most of their earnings as dividends – and urged companies to do the same. This short time horizon forced business to remain liquid rather than having leeway to pursue long‑term strategy.

German banks, by contrast, paid out dividends (and expected such dividends from their clients) at only half the rate of British banks, choosing to retain earnings as capital reserves and invest them largely in the stocks of their industrial clients. Viewing these companies as allies rather than merely as customers from whom to make as large a profit as quickly as possible, German bank officials sat on their boards, and helped expand their business by extending loans to foreign governments on condition that their clients be named the chief suppliers in major public investments. Germany viewed the laws of history as favoring national planning to organize the financing of heavy industry, and gave its bankers a voice in formulating international diplomacy, making them “the principal instrument in the extension of her foreign trade and political power.”

A similar contrast existed in the stock market. British brokers were no more up to the task of financing manufacturing in its early stages than were its banks. The nation had taken an early lead by forming Crown corporations such as the East India Company, the Bank of England and even the South Sea Company. Despite the collapse of the South Sea Bubble in 1720, the run-up of share prices from 1715 to 1720 in these joint-stock monopolies established London’s stock market as a popular investment vehicle, for Dutch and other foreigners as well as for British investors. But the market was dominated by railroads, canals and large public utilities. Industrial firms were not major issuers of stock.

In any case, after earning their commissions on one issue, British stockbrokers were notorious for moving on to the next without much concern for what happened to the investors who had bought the earlier securities. “As soon as he has contrived to get his issue quoted at a premium and his underwriters have unloaded at a profit,” complained Foxwell, “his enterprise ceases. ‘To him,’ as the Times says, ‘a successful flotation is of more importance than a sound venture.’”

Much the same was true in the United States. Its merchant heroes were individualistic traders and political insiders often operating on the edge of the law to gain their fortunes by stock-market manipulation, railroad politicking for land giveaways, and insurance companies, mining and natural resource extraction. America’s wealth-seeking spirit found its epitome in Thomas Edison’s hit-or-miss method of invention, coupled with a high degree of litigiousness to obtain patent and monopoly rights.

In sum, neither British nor American banking or stock markets planned for the future. Their time frame was short, and they preferred rent-extracting projects to industrial innovation. Most banks favored large real estate borrowers, railroads and public utilities whose income streams easily could be forecast. Only after manufacturing companies grew fairly large did they obtain significant bank and stock market credit.

What is remarkable is that this is the tradition of banking and high finance that has emerged victorious throughout the world. The explanation is primarily the military victory of the United States, Britain and their Allies in the Great War and a generation later, in World War II.

The regression toward burdensome unproductive debts after World War I

The development of industrial credit led economists to distinguish between productive and unproductive lending. A productive loan provides borrowers with resources to trade or invest at a profit sufficient to pay back the loan and its interest charge. An unproductive loan must be paid out of income earned elsewhere. Governments must pay war loans out of tax revenues. Consumers must pay loans out of income they earn at a job – or by selling assets. These debt payments divert revenue away from being spent on consumption and investment, so the economy shrinks. This traditionally has led to crises that wipe out debts, above all those that are unproductive.

In the aftermath of World War I the economies of Europe’s victorious and defeated nations alike were dominated by postwar arms and reparations debts. These inter-governmental debts were to pay for weapons (by the Allies when the United States unexpectedly demanded that they pay for the arms they had bought before America’s entry into the war), and for the destruction of property (by the Central Powers), not new means of production. Yet to the extent that they were inter-governmental, these debts were more intractable than debts to private bankers and bondholders. Despite the fact that governments in principle are sovereign and hence can annul debts owed to private creditors, the defeated Central Power governments were in no position to do this.

And among the Allies, Britain led the capitulation to U.S. arms billing, captive to the creditor ideology that “a debt is a debt” and must be paid regardless of what this entails in practice or even whether the debt in fact can be paid. Confronted with America’s demand for payment, the Allies turned to Germany to make them whole. After taking its liquid assets and major natural resources, they insisted that it squeeze out payments by taxing its economy. No attempt was made to calculate just how Germany was to do this – or most important, how it was to convert this domestic revenue (the “budgetary problem”) into hard currency or gold. Despite the fact that banking had focused on international credit and currency transfers since the 12th century, there was a broad denial of what John Maynard Keynes identified as a foreign exchange transfer problem.

Never before had there been an obligation of such enormous magnitude. Nevertheless, all of Germany’s political parties and government agencies sought to devise ways to tax the economy to raise the sums being demanded. Taxes, however, are levied in a nation’s own currency. The only way to pay the Allies was for the Reichsbank to take this fiscal revenue and throw it onto the foreign exchange markets to obtain the sterling and other hard currency to pay. Britain, France and the other recipients then paid this money on their Inter-Ally debts to the United States.

Adam Smith pointed out that no government ever had paid down its public debt. But creditors always have been reluctant to acknowledge that debtors are unable to pay. Ever since David Ricardo’s lobbying for their perspective in Britain’s Bullion debates, creditors have found it their self-interest to promote a doctrinaire blind spot, insisting that debts of any magnitude could be paid. They resist acknowledging a distinction between raising funds domestically (by running a budget surplus) and obtaining the foreign exchange to pay foreign-currency debt. Furthermore, despite the evident fact that austerity cutbacks on consumption and investment can only be extractive, creditor-oriented economists refused to recognize that debts cannot be paid by shrinking the economy.4 Or that foreign debts and other international payments cannot be paid in domestic currency without lowering the exchange rate.

The more domestic currency Germany sought to convert, the further its exchange rate was driven down against the dollar and other gold-based currencies. This obliged Germans to pay much more for imports. The collapse of the exchange rate was the source of hyperinflation, not an increase in domestic money creation as today’s creditor-sponsored monetarist economists insist. In vain Keynes pointed to the specific structure of Germany’s balance of payments and asked creditors to specify just how many German exports they were willing to take, and to explain how domestic currency could be converted into foreign exchange without collapsing the exchange rate and causing price inflation.

Tragically, Ricardian tunnel vision won Allied government backing. Bertil Ohlin and Jacques Rueff claimed that economies receiving German payments would recycle their inflows to Germany and other debt-paying countries by buying their imports. If income adjustments did not keep exchange rates and prices stable, then Germany’s falling exchange rate would make its exports sufficiently more attractive to enable it to earn the revenue to pay.

This is the logic that the International Monetary Fund followed half a century later in insisting that Third World countries remit foreign earnings and even permit flight capital as well as pay their foreign debts. It is the neoliberal stance now demanding austerity for Greece, Ireland, Italy and other Eurozone economies.

Bank lobbyists claim that the European Central Bank will risk spurring domestic wage and price inflation if it does what central banks were founded to do: finance budget deficits. Europe’s financial institutions are given a monopoly right to perform this electronic task – and to receive interest for what a real central bank could create on its own computer keyboard.

But why is it less inflationary for commercial banks to finance budget deficits than for central banks to do this? The bank lending that has inflated a global financial bubble since the 1980s has left as its legacy a debt overhead that can no more be supported today than Germany was able to carry its reparations debt in the 1920s. Would government credit have so recklessly inflated asset prices?

How debt creation has fueled asset-price inflation since the 1980s

Banking in recent decades has not followed the productive lines that early economic futurists expected. As noted above, instead of financing tangible investment to expand production and innovation, most loans are made against collateral, with interest to be paid out of what borrowers can make elsewhere. Despite being unproductive in the classical sense, it was remunerative for debtors from 1980 until 2008 – not by investing the loan proceeds to expand economic activity, but by riding the wave of asset-price inflation. Mortgage credit enabled borrowers to bid up property prices, drawing speculators and new customers into the market in the expectation that prices would continue to rise. But hothouse credit infusions meant additional debt service, which ended up shrinking the market for goods and services.

Under normal conditions the effect would have been for rents to decline, with property prices following suit, leading to mortgage defaults. But banks postponed the collapse into negative equity by lowering their lending standards, providing enough new credit to keep on inflating prices. This averted a collapse of their speculative mortgage and stock market lending. It was inflationary – but it was inflating asset prices, not commodity prices or wages. Two decades of asset price inflation enabled speculators, homeowners and commercial investors to borrow the interest falling due and still make a capital gain.

This hope for a price gain made winning bidders willing to pay lenders all the current income – making banks the ultimate and major rentier income recipients. The process of inflating asset prices by easing credit terms and lowering the interest rate was self-feeding. But it also was self-terminating, because raising the multiple by which a given real estate rent or business income can be “capitalized” into bank loans increased the economy’s debt overhead.

Securities markets became part of this problem. Rising stock and bond prices made pension funds pay more to purchase a retirement income – so “pension fund capitalism” was coming undone. So was the industrial economy itself. Instead of raising new equity financing for companies, the stock market became a vehicle for corporate buyouts. Raiders borrowed to buy out stockholders, loading down companies with debt. The most successful looters left them bankrupt shells. And when creditors turned their economic gains from this process into political power to shift the tax burden onto wage earners and industry, this raised the cost of living and doing business – by more than technology was able to lower prices.

The EU rejects central bank money creation, leaving deficit financing to the banks

Article 123 of the Lisbon Treaty forbids the ECB or other central banks to lend to government. But central banks were created specifically – to finance government deficits. The EU has rolled back history to the way things were three hundred years ago, before the Bank of England was created. Reserving the task of credit creation for commercial banks, it leaves governments without a central bank to finance the public spending needed to avert depression and widespread financial collapse.

So the plan has backfired. When “hard money” policy makers limited central bank power, they assumed that public debts would be risk-free. Obliging budget deficits to be financed by private creditors seemed to offer a bonanza: being able to collect interest for creating electronic credit that governments can create themselves. But now, European governments need credit to balance their budget or face default. So banks now want a central bank to create the money to bail them out for the bad loans they have made.

For starters, the ECB’s €489 billion in three-year loans at 1% interest gives banks a free lunch arbitrage opportunity (the “carry trade”) to buy Greek and Spanish bonds yielding a higher rate. The policy of buying government bonds in the open market – after banks first have bought them at a lower issue price – gives the banks a quick and easy trading gain.

How are these giveaways less inflationary than for central banks to directly finance budget deficits and roll over government debts? Is the aim of giving banks easy gains simply to provide them with resources to resume the Bubble Economy lending that led to today’s debt overhead in the first place?

Conclusion

Governments can create new credit electronically on their own computer keyboards as easily as commercial banks can. And unlike banks, their spending is expected to serve a broad social purpose, to be determined democratically. When commercial banks gain policy control over governments and central banks, they tend to support their own remunerative policy of creating asset-inflationary credit – leaving the clean-up costs to be solved by a post-bubble austerity. This makes the debt overhead even harder to pay – indeed, impossible.

So we are brought back to the policy issue of how public money creation to finance budget deficits differs from issuing government bonds for banks to buy. Is not the latter option a convoluted way to finance such deficits – at a needless interest charge? When governments monetize their budget deficits, they do not have to pay bondholders.

I have heard bankers argue that governments need an honest broker to decide whether a loan or public spending policy is responsible. To date their advice has not promoted productive credit. Yet they now are attempting to compensate for the financial crisis by telling debtor governments to sell off property in their public domain. This “solution” relies on the myth that privatization is more efficient and will lower the cost of basic infrastructure services. Yet it involves paying interest to the buyers of rent-extraction rights, higher executive salaries, stock options and other financial fees.

Most cost savings are achieved by shifting to non-unionized labor, and typically end up being paid to the privatizers, their bankers and bondholders, not passed on to the public. And bankers back price deregulation, enabling privatizers to raise access charges. This raises the economy’s cost base and thus lowers its competitive advantage – just the opposite of what is promised.

Banking has moved so far away from funding industrial growth and economic development that it now benefits primarily at the economy’s expense in a predator-like extractive manner, not by making productive loans. This is now the great problem confronting our time. Banks now lend mainly to other financial institutions, hedge funds, corporate raiders, insurance companies and real estate, and engage in their own speculation in foreign currency, interest-rate arbitrage, and computer-driven trading programs. Industrial firms bypass the banking system by financing new capital investment out of their own retained earnings, and meet their liquidity needs by issuing their own commercial paper directly. Yet to keep the bank casino winning, global bankers now want governments not only to bail them out but to enable them to renew their failed business plan – and to keep the present debts in place so that creditors will not have to take a loss.

This wish means that society should lose, and even suffer depression. We are dealing here not only with greed, but with outright antisocial behavior and hostility.

Europe thus has reached a critical point in having to decide whose interest to put first: that of banks, or the “real” economy. History provides a wealth of examples illustrating the dangers of capitulating to bankers, and also for how to restructure banking along more productive lines. The underlying questions are clear enough:

-Have banks outlived their historical role, or can they be restructured to finance productive capital investment rather than simply inflate asset prices?

-Would a public option provide less costly and better directed credit?

-Why not promote economic recovery by writing down debts to reflect the ability to pay, rather than relinquishing more wealth to an increasingly aggressive creditor class?

Solving the Eurozone’s financial problem can be made much easier by the tax reforms that classical economists advocated to complement their financial reforms. To free consumers and employers from taxation, they proposed to levy the burden on the “unearned increment” of land and natural resource rent, monopoly rent and financial privilege. The guiding principle was that property rights in the earth, monopolies and other ownership privileges have no direct cost of production, and hence can be taxed without reducing their supply or raising their price, which is set in the market. Removing the tax deductibility for interest is the other key reform that is needed.

A rent tax holds down housing prices and those of basic infrastructure services, whose untaxed revenue tends to be capitalized into bank loans and paid out in the form of interest charges. Additionally, land and natural resource rents – along with interest – are the easiest to tax, because they are highly visible and their value is easy to assess.

Pressure to narrow existing budget deficits offers a timely opportunity to rationalize the tax systems of Greece and other PIIGS countries in which the wealthy avoid paying their fair share of taxes. The political problem blocking this classical fiscal policy is that it “interferes” with the rent-extracting free lunches that banks seek to lend against. So they act as lobbyists for untaxing real estate and monopolies (and themselves as well). Despite the financial sector’s desire to see governments remain sufficiently solvent to pay bondholders, it has subsidized an enormous public relations apparatus and academic junk economics to oppose the tax policies that can close the fiscal gap in the fairest way.

It is too early to forecast whether banks or governments will emerge victorious from today’s crisis. As economies polarize between debtors and creditors, planning is shifting out of public hands into those of bankers. The easiest way for them to keep this power is to block a true central bank or strong public sector from interfering with their monopoly of credit creation. The counter is for central banks and governments to act as they were intended to, by providing a public option for credit creation.

Orginally published at http://michael-hudson.com/

Reforming the U.S. Financial and Tax System

Tue, 01/31/2012 - 10:57am

On November 3, 2011, Alan Minsky interviewed me on KPFK’s program, “Building a Powerful Movement in the United States” in preparation for an Occupy L.A. teach-in. Listen to the interview. To clarify my points I have edited and expanded my answers from the interview transcript.

Alan Minsky: I am joined now by Michael Hudson. He is a distinguished research professor of economics at the University of Missouri-Kansas City, and also is president of the Institute for the Study of Long Term Economic Trends. Welcome to the show, Michael.

Michael Hudson: Thank you very much.

Alan Minsky: Michael Hudson is scheduled to address Occupy L.A. as part of a teach-in that includes William Black and Robert Scheer, who will be moderating the panel that Michael will be on this weekend. Michael, I’m familiar with your work and I know that you are a big-picture economic thinker. This is definitely a movement that is asking the big questions about how the global economy and the national economy should be re-organized. What would you say to the movement at large about how best to organize a high-tech modern industrial economy in a way that would produce more social and economic justice?

America is being radicalized by coming to realize how radical Wall Street’s power grab is.

Michael Hudson: The Occupy Wall Street movement has many similarities with what used to be called the Great Awakening periods in America. Such periods always begin by realizing how serious the problem is. So diagnosis is the most important tactic. Diagnosing the problem mobilizes power for a solution. Otherwise, solutions will seem to come out of thin air and people won’t understand why they are needed, or even the problems that solutions are intended to cure.

The basic problem today is that nearly everyone is in debt. This is the problem in Europe too. There are Occupy Berlin meetings, the Greek and Icelandic protest, Spain’s “Indignant” demonstrations and similar ones throughout the world.

When debts reach today’s proportions, a basic economic principle is at work: Debts that can’t be paid; won’t be. The question is, just how are they not going to be paid? People with student loans are not permitted to declare bankruptcy to get a fresh start. The government or collection agencies dock their salaries and go after whatever property they have. Many people’s revenue over and above basic needs is earmarked to pay the bankers. Typical American wage earners pay about 40 percent of their wages on housing whose price is bid up by easy mortgage credit, and another 10 to 15 percent for credit cards and other debt service. FICA takes over 13 percent, and federal, local and sales taxes another 15 percent or so. All this leaves only about a quarter of many peoples’ paychecks available for spending on goods and services. This is what is causing today’s debt deflation. And Wall Street is supporting it, because it extracts income from the bottom 99% to pay the top 1%.

Half a century ago most economists imagined that the problem would be people saving too much as they got richer. Saving meant non-spending. But the problem has turned out to be just the opposite: debt. Overall salaries have not risen in decades, so many people have borrowed just to break even. Instead of an era of free choice, very little of their income is available for discretionary spending. It is earmarked to pay the financial, insurance and real estate sectors, not the “real” production and consumption economy. And now repayment time has arrived. People are squeezed. So when America’s saving rate recently rose from zero to 3 percent of national income, it takes the form of people paying down the debts.

Many people thought that the way to get rich faster was to borrow money to buy homes and stocks they expected to rise in price. But this has left the economy financially strapped. People are feeling depressed. The tendency is to blame themselves. I think that the Occupy Wall Street movement, at least here in New York, is like what has occurred in Greece and also in the Arab Spring. People are coming together, and at first they may simply watch what’s going on. Onlookers may come by to see what it’s all about. But then they think, “Wait a minute! Other people are having the same problem I’m having. Maybe it is not really my fault.”

So they begin to see that all these other people who have a similar problem in not being able to pay their debts, they realize that they have been financially crippled by the banks. It is not that they have done something wrong or are sore losers, as Herman Cain says. Something radically wrong with the system.

Fifty years ago an old socialist told me that revolutions happen when people just get tired of being afraid. In today’s case the revolution may grow nearer when people get over being depressed and stop blaming themselves. They come to think that we are all in this together – and if this is the case, there must be something wrong with the way the economy is organized.

Gradually, observers of Occupy Wall Street begin to feel stronger. There is positive peer pressure to reinforce their self-confidence. What they intuitively feel is that the Reagan-Clinton-Bush-Obama presidencies have squeezed their lives. The economy has become untracked.

What’s basically wrong is that the financial system is running the government. For years, Republicans and Democrats both have said that a strong government, careful regulation and progressive taxation is the road to serfdom. The politicians and neoliberal economists who write their patter talk say, “Let’s take planning out of the hands of government and put it in the ‘free market.’” But every market is planned by someone or other. If governments step aside, then planning passes into the hands of the bankers, because of their key role in allocating credit.

The problem is that they have not created credit to finance industrial investment and employment. They have lent for speculation on asset price inflation using debt leveraging to bid up housing prices, stock and bond prices, and foreign exchange rates. They have convinced borrowers that they can get rich on rising housing prices. But this merely makes new homebuyers go deeper into debt to buy a home. And when banks say that rising stock and bond prices are good for the economy, this price rise lowers the dividend or interest yield. This means that pension funds and individuals have to save much more for retirement. Instead of improving their life, it makes them work harder and borrow more just to stay in place.

The banking system’s alternative to “the road to serfdom” thus turns out to be a road to debt peonage. This financial engineering turns out to be worse than government planning. The banks have taken over the Federal Reserve and Treasury and put their lobbyists in charge – men such as Tim Geithner and the others with ties to Rubinomics dating from the Clinton administration, and especially to Goldman Sachs and other giant Wall Street firms.

So the first thing to realize is something that is characteristic of all great reform movements. Voters are not yet supporting a radical position to restructure the whole system. But at least they are coming to see that small marginal reforms won’t work, or are simply trick promises, like President Obama’s promise that banks would renegotiate mortgages for homes in negative equity as part of the quid pro quo for the bailouts they received from Treasury Secretary Geithner. There’s been no quid pro quo, merely talk.

People see that law enforcement is missing when it comes to the banks and Wall Street. So simply restoring the criminal justice system would be progress. It used to be that if you ran a fraud, if you cheated people, if you lied on your income tax and falsified statistics, then you would be sent to jail. But the Obama administration has appointed Eric Holder to represent Wall Street. He has not thrown any bankers in jail, recognizing that they are the major campaign contributors of the party, after all.

What is easiest for most people to accept is the idea of restoring the way the economy used to be more in balance – back when people earned income by being productive rather than getting rich by transferring other peoples’ savings and public giveaways into their own pockets. But what I sensed in New York was anger not only at this economic problem, but the fact that the political system is broken. There is no one to vote for as an alternative to pro-bank candidates. So what began as anger has become a gathering awareness that Mr. Obama was simply fooling voters instead of leading the change he promised. That’s what politicians do, of course. But people hoped that he might be different. That was the gullibility he played on. He has turned into the nightmare they thought they were voting against.

Moving to the right of the Republicans, he started his administration by appointing the Simpson-Bowles Commission staffed by opponents of Social Security. He recently followed that up by appointing the Congressional Super-committee of Twelve to come out with an even more anti-Social Security, anti-Medicaid and anti-minority position that the Republicans could get away with. If they would have tried to pass such a right-wing policy, the Democratic Congress would have refused to pass it. But they don’t know how to deal with a Democratic president who appoints Wall Street lobbyists to his cabinet and acts like Margaret Thatcher saying that There Is No Alternative (TINA) to making Social Security recipients, labor and minorities pay for Wall Street’s bad gambles and bank losses. He has helped Wall Street capture the government – on behalf of the 1%.

The man whom Mr. Obama asked to be his mentor when he joined the Senate was Joe Lieberman. He evidently gave Obama expert advice about how to raise funds from the financial class by delivering his liberal constituency to his Wall Street campaign contributors. So the problem is not that President Obama is well meaning but inept – an idealist who just can’t fight the vested interests and insiders. He’s thrown in his lot with them. In fact, he really seems to believe the right-wing, pro-Wall Street ideology – that the economy can’t function without a financial system that guarantees “savers” (the top 1%) against loss, even when the bottom 99% have to pay more and more.

And on a personal level, Mr. Obama knows that his fund raising comes mainly from Wall Street, and the only way to get this money is to sell out his constituency. You’ve got to give him enough credit to recognize this obvious fact.

The upshot is that we now have a political nightmare. Yet Mr. Obama still seems to be the best that the Democrats can offer! This is why I think the protestors are saying they are not going to let the Democrats jump in front of the parade to try and mobilize support for their party. Like the Irish say: “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.” They realize that the financial system is broken and that neither party is trying to do much about it. So the political system has to be changed as well as the economic system.

Suppose you were going to design a society from scratch. Would you create what we have now? Or would you start, for instance, by reforming the most egregious distortions of campaign finance? As matters stand, Goldman Sachs has been able to buy the right to name who is going to be Treasury Secretary. They selected Geithner, who gave them $29 billion from A.I.G. just before he was appointed. It’s like that all down the line – in both parties. Every Democratic congressional committee chairman has to pay to the Party a $150,000 to buy the chairmanship. This means that the campaign donors get to determine who gets committee chairmanships. This is oligarchy, not democracy. So the system is geared to favor whoever can grab the most money. Wall Street does it by financial siphoning and asset stripping. Politicians do it by getting money from the beneficiaries – the 1%.

Once people realize that they’re being screwed, that’s a pre-revolutionary situation. It’s a situation where they can get a lot of sympathy and support, precisely by not doing what The New York Times and the other papers say they should do: come up with some neat solutions. They don’t have to propose a solution because right now there isn’t one – without changing the system with many, many changes. So many that it’s like a new Constitution. Politics as well as the economy need to be restructured. What’s developing now is how to think about the economic and political problems that are bothering people. It is not radical to realize that the economy isn’t working. That is the first stage to realizing that a real alternative is needed. We’ve been under a radical right-wing attack – and need to respond in kind. The next half-year probably will be spent trying to spell out what the best structure would be.

There is no way to clean up the mess that the Democratic Party has become since politics moved into Wall Street’s pockets. The Republicans also have become a party of lobbyists. So it looks like there is no solution within the existent system. This is a revolutionary, radical situation. The longer that the OWS groups can spend on diagnosing the problem and explaining how far wrong the system has gone, the longer the demonstrators can gain support by showing that they share the feelings everybody has these days – a feeling of being victimized. This is what is creating a raw material that has to potential to flower into political activism, perhaps by spring or summer next year.

The most important message is that all this impoverishment and indebtedness is unnecessary. There is no inherent economic reason for things to be this way. It is not really the way that “markets” need to work. There are many kinds of markets, with many different sets of rules. So the important task is to explain to people how many possibilities there are to make things better. And of course, this is what frightens politicians, Wall Street lobbyists and the other members of the pro-oligarchic army of financial raiders.

Alan Minsky: Well, let me ask you this – and of course, it is something of an intellectual speculative game. Let’s say that it’s January 2013, and the radical progressive candidate X, Dennis Kucinich or Bernie Sanders, is miraculously elected president, and Michael Hudson is the chief economic advisor. What would you do, given the opportunity with a favorable congress, to transform the American economy in ways that would produce policies you think would at least start to help break the grip that the financial sector has had in devastating the economy in terms of its performance for average households?

Restore America’s past prosperity and rescue the future from the financial grabbers

Michael Hudson: There are two stages to any kind of a transformation. The first stage is simply to start re-applying the laws and the taxes that the Bush and Obama administrations have stopped applying. You don’t want Wall Street to be able to put its industry lobbyists in charge of making policy. So the first task is to get rid of Geithner, Holder and the similar pro-financial administrators whom Obama has appointed to his cabinet and in key regulatory positions. This kind of clean-up requires election reform – and that requires a reversal of the Supreme Court’s recent Citizens United ruling that enables a financial oligarchy to lock in its control of American politics.

One of the first things that is needed – and only a President could do it – would be to demand a new Supreme Court. This is what Roosevelt threatened, and it worked. You make them an offer they can’t refuse. If this can be done only by expanding the number of court justices, then you nominate ones who are not radicals on the right – judges who will reverse the 19th-century ruling that corporations are the same as people and indeed have even more rights (and certainly more campaign money) than people have. You then move to clean up the corruption of the legal system that has protected financial crooks instead of sending them to jail. Financial fraud has effectively been decriminalized, at least by Wall Street’s largest campaign contributors.

But this is really Bill Black’s area. I’m only going to talk about financial and tax reforms here, because they are the easiest to understand and ultimately the most immediate task.

Prevent monopoly price gouging. Bring bank charges in line with the real cost of doing business.

What is needed today is more than just going back to the past ideals. After all, the good old class warfare was not so rosy either. But at least the Progressive Era had a program to subordinate finance to serve industry and the rest of the economy. The problem is that its reformers never really had a chance to carry out the ideas that classical economists outlined.

The classical idea of a free market economy was radical in its way – precisely by being natural and thus getting rid of unnatural warping by special privileges for absentee landlords and banks. This led logically to socialism, which is why the history of economic thought has been dropped – indeed, excluded – from today’s academic curriculum. What is needed is to complete the direction of change that World War I interrupted and that the Cold War further untracked. After 1945 you didn’t hear anything any more about what John Maynard Keynes called for at the end of his General Theory in 1936: “euthanasia of the rentier.” But this was the great fight for many centuries of European reform, and it even was the path along which industrial capitalism was expected to evolve. So let me begin with what was discussed back in the 1930s, trying to recover the Progressive Era reforms.

Setting up a more fair banking and financial system requires changing the tax favoritism as well, which I will discuss below. There are a number of good proposals for reform. One of the easiest and least radical is set up a public option for banking. Instead of relying on Bank of America or Citibank for credit cards, the government would set up a bank and offer credit cards, check clearing and bank transfers at cost.

The idea throughout the nineteenth century was to create this kind of public option. There was a Post Office bank, and that could still be elaborated to provide banking services at cost or at a subsidized price. After all, in Russia and Japan the post office banks are the largest of all!

The logic for a public banking option is the same as for governments providing free roads: The aim is to minimize the cost of living and doing business. On my website, michael-hudson.com, I have posted an article just published in the American Journal of Economics and Sociology on Simon Patten. He was the first professor of economics at the Wharton Business School. He spelled out the logic of public infrastructure as a “fourth” factor of production (alongside, labor, capital and land). Its productivity is to be measured not by how much profit it makes, but by how much it lowers the economy’s price structure.

Providing a public option would limit the ability of banks to charge monopoly prices for credit cards and loans. It also would not engage in the kind of gambling that has made today’s financial system so unstable and put depositors’ money at risk. Ideally, I would like to see banks act more like the old savings banks and S&Ls. In fact, the most radical regulatory proposal I would like to see is the Chicago Plan promoted in the 1930s by the free marketer Herbert Simon. This is what Dennis Kucinich recently proposed in his National Emergency Employment Defense Act of 2011 (NEED).

This may seem radical at first glance, but how else are you going to stop the banks from their mad computerized gambling, political lobbying and creating credit for corporate raiders to borrow and pay their financial backers by emptying out pension funds and cutting back long-term investment, research and development?

The guiding idea is to take away the banks’ privilege of creating credit electronically on their computer keyboards. You make banks do what textbooks say they are supposed to do: take deposits and lend them out in a productive way. If there are not enough deposits in the economy, the Treasury can create money on its own computer keyboards and supply it to the banks to lend out. But you would rewrite the banking laws so that normal banks are not able to gamble or play the computerized speculative games they are playing today.

The obvious way to do this is to reinstate the Glass-Steagall Act so that they can’t gamble with insured deposits. This way, speculators would bear the burden if they lost, not be in a position to demand “taxpayer liability” by threatening to collapse the normal vanilla banking system. Abolishing Glass-Steagall opened the way for Wall Street to organize a protection racket by mixing up peoples’ deposits with bad gambles and with the growth of debts way beyond the ability to be paid.

To sum up, the idea is to shape markets so as to steer the banks to lend for actual capital formation and to finance home ownership without credit inflation that simply bids up prices for homes as well as for other real estate, stocks, and bonds.

Tax reform needs to back up and reinforce financial reform

Today’s economic problem is systemic. This is what makes any solution so inherently radical. In changing part of the economic system, you have to adjust everything, just as when a doctor operates on a human body. Financial reform requires tax reform, because much of the financial problem stems from the tax shift off real estate and finance onto labor and industry. Taxes are the business of Congress, not the President or his advisors, but I assume that your question really concerns what I think the economy needs.

The most obvious fiscal task that most people understand – and support – is to restore the progressive tax system that existed before 1980, and especially before the Clinton and Bush tax cuts. It used to be that the rich paid taxes. Now they don’t. But the key isn’t just income-tax rates as such. What needs to be recognized is the kind of taxes that should be levied – or how to shift them back off labor onto property where they were before the 1980s. You need to restore the land taxes to collect the “free lunch” that is not really “free” if it is pledged to pay the banks in the form of mortgage interest.

Over the past few decades the tax system has been warped more and more by bank lobbyists to promote debt financing. Debt is their “product,” after all. As matters now stand, earnings and dividends on equity financing must pay much higher tax rates than cash flow financed with debt. This distortion needs to be reversed. It not only taxes the top 1% at a much lower rate than the bottom 99%, but it also encourages them to make money by lending to the bottom 99%. The result is that the bottom 99% have become increasingly indebted to the top 1%. The enormous bank debt attached to real estate does not reflect rising rents as much as it reflects the tax cuts on property. Wall Street lobbyists have backed Congressional leaders who have shifted taxes onto consumers via sales taxes and income taxes, as well as FICA payroll withholding. This ploy treats Social Security and Medicare as “user fees” rather than paying them out of the overall budget – and financed out of progressive taxation on the top 1%. If wage earners pay more in FICA, you can be sure that the wealthy get a tax cut.

This anti-progressive tax shift is largely responsible for the richest 1% doubling their share of income. It also has led to the 99% having to pay banks what they used to pay the tax collector. They pay interest rather than taxes. If I were economic advisor, I would explain just how this works – which is what I already try to do on my website. In a nutshell, the tax shifts since World War II have left more and more of the land’s site value to be capitalized into interest payments on bank loans. So the banks have ended up with what used to be taken by landowners. There is no inherent need for this. It doesn’t help the economy; it merely inflates a real estate bubble. Economic growth and employment would be much stronger if income tax rates were lowered for most people. Property owners and speculators would pay. There would be less free lunch and more “earned” income.

The Obama Administration has proposed the worse of both worlds – getting rid of the tax deductibility of interest for homeowners. This would squeeze them, without scaling down the bank debts that have absorbed the cuts in property taxes. So Mr. Obama is sponsoring yet another anti-consumer proposal to make the bottom 99% pay for government – while using government funds to subsidize the banks and bail out their bad bets.

What needs to be done is to remove the tax deductibility of interest for investors in general. This tax favoritism is a subsidy for debt financing – and the main problem that the U.S. economy faces today is over-indebtedness. A good policy would aim at lowering the debt overhead. Debt leveraging should be discouraged, not encouraged.

Speculators have borrowed largely to make capital gains. They originally were taxed as normal income in the 1913 income tax. The logic was that capital gains build up a person’s savings, just as earning an income does. But the financial and real estate interests fought back, and today there is only a tiny tax on capital gains – a tax that sellers don’t have to pay if they plow their money into another property or investment to make yet more gains! So when Wall Street firms, hedge funds, and other speculators avoid paying normal taxes by saying that they don’t “earn” money but simply make capital gains, this is where a large part of today’s economic inequality lies.

I would tax these asset-price gains (mainly land prices) either at the full income-tax rate or even higher. The wealthy 1% make their gains in this way, claiming that they don’t really “earn” income, so they shouldn’t have to pay taxes as if they are wages or profits. But that’s precisely the problem: Why would you want to subsidize not earning income, but merely making money by speculating – and then demanding that the government bail you out if you make a capital loss when your speculations go bad, on the logic that you have tied up most peoples’ normal bank deposits in these gambles? This is what exists today. And it is why people think the system is so unfair. Most of the super-rich families have made their fortunes by insider dealing and financial extraction, not by being productive. They are not “job creators” these days. They have become job destroyers by demanding austerity to squeeze out more money from a shrinking economy to pay themselves.

Many people – especially homeowners – are sucked into thinking that low capital gains taxes make them rich, and that high property prices leave them with less to spend. But this turns out not to be the case once the process works its way through the economy. These workings need to be more widely explained.

For many years families got rich as the price of their home rose. But they also got much deeper in debt. The real estate bubble was debt-financed. A property is worth whatever a bank will lend against it. The end result of “easy lending” and tax distortions to favor interest-bearing debt is that most families own a smaller and smaller proportion of their homes’ value – and have to pay rising mortgage debt service. This doesn’t really make them better off. The job of a president or economic advisor should be to explain how this game works, so people can get off the debt treadmill. The economy will shrink if it doesn’t lower its debt overhead.

I would close down tax avoidance in offshore banking centers by treating offshore deposits by Americans as “earned but hoarded” income and tax it at 90%. You restore the rates of the Eisenhower administration when the country had the most rapid debt growth that it had. You reinstate criminal penalties for financial fraud and tax evasion by misrepresentation. But the tax avoiders are asking the Obama administration to do just the opposite: to declare a “tax holiday” to “induce” them bring this offshore money home – by not taxing it at all! This kind of giveaway should be blocked. Tax avoiders among the top 1% should be penalized, not rewarded.

The Bush-Obama administration has promoted “neoliberal” tax and financial policies that have reversed a century of Progressive Era reforms. The past 30 years have suffered a radical transformation of tax policy and financial policy. So it takes an equally deep response to undo their distortions and put the American economy back on track. The guiding idea is simply to restore normalcy. The Progressive Era that emerged from classical economics understood the economic benefits of taxing unearned wealth (“rent extraction”) at the top of the economic pyramid, provide basic infrastructure services at cost rather than creating fiefdoms for privatizers to install tollbooths and make their gains tax-exempt. Radical neoliberalism has reversed this. It has vastly multiplied the debts owed by the bottom 99% to the top 1%.

This is leading to debt peonage and what really is neo-feudalism. We are seeing a kind of financial warfare that is as grabbing as the old-style military conquests. The aim is the same: the land, basic infrastructure, and use of the government to extract tribute.

A financial Clean Slate

To restore the kind of normalcy that made America rich, most important long-term policy would be to recognize what is going to be inevitable for every economy. Debts need to be written down – and the politically easiest way to cut through the tangle is to write them off altogether. That would free the bottom 99% from their debt bondage to the top 1%. It would be a Clean Slate, starting over – and trying to do things right this time around. The creditors have not used the banking system to make America more productive and richer. They have used it as a vehicle to reduce the population to debt serfdom.

A debt write-down sounds radical and unworkable, but it’s been done since World War II with great success. It is the program the Allies carried out in the German economy in that country’s 1947 currency reform. This was the policy that created Germany’s Economic Miracle. And America could experience a similar miracle.

Any economy would benefit from cancelling the bad debts that have been built up. Keeping them on the books will handcuff the economy and cause debt deflation by diverting income to pay debt service rather than to spend on goods and services. We are going into a new economic depression – not just a “Great Recession” – because most spending is now on finance, insurance and real estate, not on goods and basic services. So markets are shrinking, and unemployment is rising. That is what will happen if debts are not written down.

This can be done either by a Clean Slate across the board, or it can be done more selectively, by applying what’s been New York State law since before the Revolution, going back to when New York was still a colony. I’m referring to the law of fraudulent conveyance. This law says that if a creditor lends to a borrower without having any idea how the debtor can pay in the normal course of business, without losing property, the loan is deemed to be fraudulent and declared null and void.

Applying this law to defaulting homeowners would free the homes that are in negative equity throughout the country. It would undo the fraudulent loans that banks have made, the trick loans with exploding interest rates, balloon mortgages and so forth. It also would free debt-strapped companies from being forced to sell off their parts to make their corporate raiders rich.

As an associated law, pension funds should be first in line in any bankruptcy, not at the end of the line as they now are. Current practice lets companies replace defined-benefit programs with defined contribution programs – where all that employees know is how much is taken out of their paychecks each month, not what they will be receiving when they retire. Only the managers have protected their pensions with special contracts and golden parachutes. This is the reverse of what pension plans were supposed to do.

Employee Stock Option Plans (ESOPs) also are being looted. This is what has recently happened at the Chicago Tribune by Sam Zell, who borrowed money and repaid it by looting the Tribune’s ESOP. A fraudulent conveyance law applied at the nationwide level would stop this. People like Zell are looters, and so are the bankers behind him. This is the class warfare that is being waged today. And the war is being won by the 1% – while pushing the American economy into depression.

As part of the rules to define what constitutes “fraudulent” or irresponsible lending, mortgage debt service should be reduced to the rate that FDIC head Sheila Bair recommended: 32 percent. The problem with debt write-downs, of course, is that when you cancel a debt, you also cancel some party’s savings on the other side of the balance sheet. In this case, the banks would have to give up their claims. But this is what used to happen in financial crashes. When debts go bad, so do the loans. So the government is radical in saying that America’s debts will be kept on the book, but it will create new public debt to give to Wall Street for its own debts that have gone bad as a result of its reckless lending.

The banks obviously would prefer to bankrupt millions of homeowners than to take even a penny’s loss. Their fight to make the government pay for their bad debts – while keeping the debts of the bottom 99% on the books – explains why the richest 1% of Americans have doubled their share of income and the returns to wealth in the last thirty years. That’s inequitable. Their accumulation of financial savings has not taken the form of tangible capital investment in factories or other enterprises to employ labor. It’s looted labor’s savings and got employees so deep into debt that they’re “one paycheck away from homelessness.” They’re afraid to go on strike, because they would miss a mortgage payment or an electric utility payment, and their credit-card interest rates would jump to 29 percent. They’re even afraid to complain about working conditions today, because they’re afraid of getting fired.

This wasn’t formerly the case. It is the result of “financial engineering” that should be reversed. There’s no reason to treat the savings that the top 1% have got in this predatory way as being sacrosanct. Their gain – their increase in financial wealth, in bonds, savings and ownership of bank loans – equals the debts that have been imposed on the bottom 99%. This is the basic equation that needs to be more widely understood. It is not an equilibrium equation. At least, it won’t be political equilibrium when people start to push back.

We are seeing a financial grab for special privilege and for political power to use the government to subsidize the top 1% at the expense of the bottom 99%, by scaling back social spending, Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and federal revenue sharing with the states. The Treasury and Federal Reserve have printed new debt to give to Wall Street – some $13 trillion and still counting since Lehman Brothers went under in September 2008. Tim Geithner and Hank Paulson used the crisis as an opportunity to give enormous U.S. debt to Wall Street. That’s more radical than reversing this to restore the economy’s financial structure to the way it used to be. If you don’t restore it, you’ve replaced economic democracy with financial oligarchy.

The way to reverse this power grab is to reverse the giveaways by cancelling the bad debts that have been loaded onto the economy. That is the only way to restore balance and prevent the polarization that has occurred. The problem is that savings by the top 1% have been used in a parasitic, extractive manner. It has been lent to the bottom 99 percent to get them deeper and deeper into debt. So they “owe their soul to the company store,” as the song Sixteen Tons put it. “You get a day older, and deeper in debt.”

The government itself has become more indebted, most recently by the $13 trillion in new debt printed and given to the banks to make sure that no financial gambler need surfer a loss. At the same time the Obama administration did this, it claimed that a generation in the future, the Social Security system may be $1 trillion in deficit. And that, Mr. Obama says, would cause a crisis – and not leave enough to continue subsidizing his leading campaign contributors. So in view of this new debt creation – while moving debts to consumers and Social Security contributors to the bottom of the list – if you are going to reverse the bad-debt polarization that we’ve reached today, it is necessary to do more than simply reinstate progressive taxation and shift the tax system so that you collect predatory unearned income – what the classical economists call economic rent. The burdensome debts need to be written off.

This probably will take half a year to get most people to realize and accept the idea is to reconstitute the system by lending for productive purposes, not speculation and rent-seeking opportunities. You want to stop the banks from lobbying for monopolies to create a market for leveraged buy-outs of these opportunities – and of course also for real estate speculation and outright gambling.

Wall Street has orchestrated and lobbied for a rentier alliance whose wealth is growing at the expense of the economy at large. It is extractive, not productive. But this fact is concealed by the national income and product accounts reporting financial and other FIRE sector takings as “earnings” rather than as a transfer payment from the economy at large – from the 99% – to the 1% of Americans who have got rich by making money off finance, monopolies and absentee real estate rent-seeking.

It is not really radical to resist Wall Street’s financial attack on America. Resistance is natural – and so is a reversal of the savings they have built up by indebting the rest of the economy to themselves. They have taken their money and run, stashing it offshore in tax-avoidance islands, in Switzerland, Britain and other havens. Shame on the political hacks who defend this and who attack Occupy Wall Street simply for resisting the financial sector’s own radical power grab and shifted taxes off themselves onto the bottom 99%.

Privatization is an asset grab masquerading as full employment policy 

Alan Minsky: I have one final question for you. Would you support programs that are put forward similar to what Randy Wray, an associate of yours, suggests in terms of government employment projects to guarantee full employment?

Michael Hudson: Yes, of course I approve. In fact, it was I who introduced Randy, Pavlina Tchernova and others to Dennis Kucinich’s staff to help write his full-employment proposal along these lines. My first caveat is to warn against letting the Obama administration turn these projects into a military giveaway. I think Randy and I are in agreement with that.

My second caveat is to prevent this full-employment program from creating a later privatization giveaway to Wall Street – that is, infrastructure that the government will sell off to the ruling party’s major campaign contributors for pennies on the dollar. This is what Public/Private Partnerships have become, as pioneered in England under Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair. Wall Street is rubbing its metaphoric hands and saying, “That’s a great idea! Let the government pay for infrastructure and spend a billion dollars on a bridge – and then sell it to us for a dollar.” The “us” may not be the banks themselves, but their customers, who will borrow the money and pay the banks an underwriting commission as well as interest on the money they use to buy what the government is privatizing.

The pretense is that privatization is more efficient. But privatizers add on interest and financial fees, high executive salaries and bonuses, and turn the roads into toll roads and other infrastructure into neofeudal fiefdoms to charge monopolistic access fees for people to use. This is what has happened in Chicago when it sold off its sidewalks to let bankers finance parking meters in exchange for a loan. Chicago needed this loan because the financial lobbyists demanded that it cut taxes on commercial real estate and on the rich. So the financial sector first creates a problem by loading the economy down with debt, and then “solves” it by demanding privatization sell-offs under distress conditions.

This is happening not only in America, but in Greece and other countries under the insistence of Europe’s bank lobbying organization, the European Central Bank. That’s why there are riots in Athens. So the financial war against society is not only being waged here, but throughout the world.

To answer your question about how best to promote full employment, the aim should be to invest public money in a way that the Republicans and Democrats cannot later turn around and privatize the capital investment at a giveaway price. So I am all on favor of public infrastructure spending as long as you have safeguards against the financial fraud and giveaways to insiders of the sort that the current administration is sponsoring. The privatizers and their banks would like to install tollbooths on new bridges and get a free ride to turn America into a tollbooth economy. But that’s really another story.

Alan Minsky: Michael Hudson, I want to thank you for joining us on KPFK.

Michael Hudson: Thanks a lot, Alan.

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